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Abstract  
 
Argentina was one of the first countries in the world to implement a comprehensive 
reform of its electricity sector in the recent period. Among developing countries only 
Chile has had a comparably comprehensive and successful reform. This paper traces the 
history of the Argentine reform, which began in 1992, and assesses its progress and its 
lessons. We conclude that the reform was very successful prior to the collapse of the 
Argentine peso in early 2002. We suggest lessons for the generation, transmission and 
distribution sectors, as well as the economic regulation of electricity and the general 
institutional environment favourable to reform. We note that the achievements of the 
sector are now threatened by the delays in tackling the financial consequences of the peso 
devaluation. 
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Electricity Reform in Argentina 
Lessons for Developing Countries 
 
1. Background 
 
Argentina is one of the world’s leading countries in terms of comprehensive electricity 
sector reform. The sector was substantially restructured in 1992 as part of the 
reorganisation and privatisation programme of the first term of the government of 
President Menem. This reform saw the break-up of the three vertically integrated state-
owned companies into 27 separate generating units, 7 transmission companies and 
several distribution companies. These were then privatised. This reform took place only 2 
years after the landmark reorganisation of the UK’s electricity sector. Together with its 
next door neighbour, Chile, Argentina was long thought of as having been host to the 
most comprehensive and generally successful electricity reform among developing 
countries. 
 
The experience of the electricity sector in Argentina cannot be separated from that of the 
rest of the economy. Argentina has had a turbulent economic and political history. In 
1900 Argentina had the second highest income per capita of any country. Its wealth was 
based on its large and fertile agricultural land area capable of producing high value added 
exports, in particular beef cattle. However the country struggled to convert its initial 
advantages into successful industrial development and was troubled by a substantial 
underclass and associated poor distribution of income. The election of a populist 
government led by General Peron in 1946 was folowed by a military government in 
1955, which continued with only brief interludes of democracy until 1983. This sorry 
history was marked by class conflict between rich landowners, the middle classes and the 
underclass. By 1983 Argentina had been reduced to a developing country with large 
international debts and high unemployment. 
 
Following a sharp deterioration in the country’s fortunes during the 1980s, Carlos 
Menem was elected president in 1989. Menem was a populist from the Peronist party and 
initially espoused an agenda of radical social reform. However realising that Argentina’s 
hyperinflation was driven by large fiscal deficits, the Menem government began a 
massive privatisation programme which eventually privatised 154 state companies in 
energy (inc luding gas supply and electricity) telecommunications, railways, banking and 
other sectors.2 The privatisations raised $19.4bn, including $14bn of cash and $13.7bn of 
nominal debt repurchased – this sum represents around 13% of GDP in 2002. 80% of the 
revenue was raised between 1990 and 1993. The privatisations also substantially reduced 
the losses on state owned companies, which had been 3% of GDP in 1989.3 The scale and 
speed of the privatisation was staggering. Even the UK, thought to be the world leader in 
mass privatisations, the total sum raised was only around 10% of 2002 GDP and it took 
around 12 years to raise 80% of the total value.4 
                                                
2 See Galiani et al. (2003), Section 2, for details of the privatisation programme. 
3 See Ennis and Pinto (2002, p.71). 
4 If we date the UK privatisation programme from October 1979 to July 1996, the total value raised was 
£61,973m, 80% of this was not raised until March 1991 (see Pollitt, 1999, p.37). 
3 
 
The privatisation of the electricity sector was one of the most significant privatisations 
and was masterminded by the Minister of Energy, Carlos Bastos. Bastos was one of the 
leading reformers within the government. The privatisation programme occurred against 
the important macroeconomic background of the creation of one to one convertibility 
between the Argentine Peso and the US dollar in 1991. This provided assurance for 
foreign investors who enthusiastically bought shares in the newly privatised companies 
and began to invest heavily in upgrading the capital stock of their companies. 
 
The privatisation programme successfully reduced the government debt in the early 
1990s and associated interest payments.5 Government debt fell from $78.9bn in 1990 to 
$69.6bn in 1993 and associated interest payments as a percentage of GDP stayed low in 
the first years of the 1990s before rising sharply as the privatisation revenue stream 
slowed. Public support for commercial activity fell from 11.7% of public expenditure in 
1991 to 5.4% in 2000, of this fall more than half was due to reduced support for the 
electricity and gas sectors.6 The stock market was stimulated with 38.5% of all dividends 
paid between 1992-1999 coming from privatised companies. However in the second 
Menem term government expenditure began to increase rapidly and the fiscal deficit 
began to worsen. This put pressure on the parity between the dollar and the peso. Menem 
left office in 1999. 
 
The macro-economy continued to deteriorate and in early 2002 the government was 
forced to abandon peso parity with the dollar and let the currency float freely. The Peso 
collapsed to less than 30% of its former value and Argentina defaulted on its overseas 
debts. This economic crisis which was accompanied by bank runs and a massive surge in 
unemployment provoked a political crisis. The elected President Fernando de la Rua was 
forced to resign in December 2001 to eventually be replaced by the interim 
administration of Eduardo Duhalde in January 2002. His administration lasted until fresh 
elections in May 2003 when Nestor Kirchner succeeded to the presidency. The economy 
began a recovery as its exports benefited from the effect of the massive devaluation but 
the economic and political situation remains fragile in mid 2004. In particular the country 
has defaulted on its sovereign debt and investors currently rate Argentina as one of the 
worst prospects for electricity investment of any large developing country. 7 
 
The period since the crisis of February 2002 has had a marked effect on the privatised 
sectors. Most privatised companies were under foreign control at the start of the crisis 
and had prices that were officially pegged to the US dollar. This was the contractual 
underpinning of the large investments which overseas companies have made in Argentina 
since 1990. In the electricity sector total investment was $12.5bn, of which 60% is 
represented by post-privatisation investments (much of it coming from overseas 
investors).8 Regulated residential tariffs were frozen in peso terms in February 2002 
leaving most companies shouldering heavy financial losses once loans have been repaid 
                                                
5 See Ennis and Pinto (2002, pp.71-79). 
6 See Ennis and Pinto (2002, p.78). 
7 Survey reported in Lamech and Saeed (2003). 
8 CAISE (2002, p.4). 
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in dollars. The World Bank has been involved in negotiations with the government about 
allowing the prices to rise in order to allow some recovery of initial investments and to 
ensure that future investment is not prejudiced. This process has not lead to a resolution 
of the contractual disputes between the private companies and the government and the 
political cost of substantial price rises for utilities remains high. Since the beginning of 
2004 strong demand for electricity stimulated by rapid economic growth and  low relative 
energy prices, has led to electricity supply shortages and emergency measures to reduce 
demand and increase domestic supply. 
 
Argentina is an enigma among developing countries. In spite of a well-educated 
workforce, abundant natural resources and strong cultural links to both Europe and the 
US it is characterised by political instability and periodic macroeconomic crises of a 
substantial magnitude. The political system finds it very difficult to manage the state 
budget responsibly and to stabilise the macro environment. Within this context, making 
credible commitments not to arbitrarily regulate the electricity sector and to honour 
concession contracts is very difficult. The instability of the Argentine institutional 
environment since 1973, when President Peron (elected for a third time) died in office, is 
in marked contrast to its neighbour Chile.9 
 
Argentina is an important case study of electricity reform because it shares many of the 
features of developing countries’ electricity systems. Like Brazil and India it is a federal 
state and the provinces retain a large degree of autonomy over the regulation of local 
utilities including the power to privatise local distribution utilities and to set residential 
prices. The population is significant at 38.4m and it has some ability to exploit economies 
of scale. The GDP per head was US $2700 in 2002 (at market exchange rates), this figure 
being barely unchanged from that in 1992 following a 15% fall in GDP between 2000 
and 2002.10 However there has been a significant economic recovery in 2003 and into 
2004 with annualised GDP growth of around 8% in 2003 and around 10% at the 
beginning of 2004. 11 Electricity consumption per head is relatively low but grew rapidly 
between 1992 and 2002 (3.3% p.a.). The electricity system has significant hydro capacity 
(just under 40% of the total in 2002)12. Argentina shares the political and macroeconomic 
instability of many other developing countries but is perhaps unusual in its capacity for 
designing and running sophisticated economic institutions such as those required by a 
deregulated electricity market. 
 
 
2. Argentina’s Electricity Reform 
 
The privatisation of the electricity sector was one of the most comprehensive of the 
Menem period. Starting from an industry which was wholly state and provincially owned, 
                                                
9 See Murillo (2001) and Heller and McCubbins (1996) for comparisons of the political background to 
reform in Chile and Argentina. 
10 Source: World Bank, ‘Argentina at a glance’, at 
http://www.worldbank.org/data/countrydata/aag/arg_aag.pdf 
11 See www.indec.gov.ar 
12 Source: CAMMESA website. 
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more than 80% of the generation, all of the transmission and 60% of the distribution 
sector was transferred into private ownership. Remaining public ownership was limited to 
the state owned nuclear power generating company and two hydro-electric plants (with 
foreign ownership) in the generation sector and some provincially owned distribution 
companies. There was also come co-operative ownership. A basic sketch of the Argentine 
electricity system can be gained from Figures 1 to 4 and Table 1 in the appendices. The 
comprehensive nature of the electricity reform in Argentina reflected the neo-liberal 
nature of the incoming government and the poor performance of the sector prior to 
privatisation. Severe blackouts had occ urred in the summers of 1988 and 1989, thermal 
generation plant suffered from poor availability (over 50% in 1991) and distribution 
system losses (up to 22% in 1991) were high (partly due to theft).13  
 
Half of the population live in the Greater Buenos Aires area (the so called Gran Buenos 
Aires). This area accounts for nearly half of GDP and of electricity demand. The national 
transmission system is focussed on supplying power to this region. It was the state owned 
companies in this region that were at the forefront of the privatisation. A first attempt to 
address the problems of the sector was the adoption of the Federal Electricity Pact (Pacto 
Federal Electrico) in November 1989, but by early 1991 nothing much had changed. 
Therefore a new electricity industry was designed in 1990-91 by the Ministry of Energy, 
supported by the World Bank. It came into being with a new Electricity Law (24,065) in 
April 1992 and was carried out over 1992-93.14 This law together with Decree 634/91 of 
April 1991 constituted the legal framework for the transformation of the sector and 
provided for: the break-up and sale of the existing state owned companies; the creation of 
a wholesale energy market; the creation of a sector specific regulator; and the definition 
of the powers of the Secretary of Energy in the new system. It also established a Federal 
Energy Council to advise the Secretary of Energy and the Congress and administer the 
National Fund of Electricity, which is used for regional subsidies. 
 
Law 24,605 characterized electricity transmission and distribution as public services to be 
provided under monopolistic conditions and thus prescribed regulatory oversight of 
prices and quality to guard against the abuse of market power and monopolistic 
exploitation.  The law further required “open access” for transmission and distribution 
facilities—third parties are to afforded non-discriminatory access to the grid.  Distributors 
were placed under a public utility obligation to supply all the energy demanded within 
their concession areas.  Generation on the other hand was deemed to be a structurally 
competitive activity.  Still the law required all generators to receive a uniform rate (taking 
into account the system’s short-marginal cost and the cost of non-supplied energy) at 
each delivery site determined by the National Load Dispatch (Legisa 1999). 
 
The largest state owned company Servicios Electricos del Gran Buenos Aires (SEGBA) 
was broken into 5 generation firms and 3 distribution companies.15 The distribution 
companies created were Edenor S.A., Edesur S.A. and Edelap S.A. The first two were the 
largest and represented more than 1/3 of all electricity customers in the country and their 
                                                
13 See CAISE (2002, pp.19-20). 
14 See Delfino and Casarin (2003) for details of the break-up of the state owned electricity companies. 
15 See Delfino and Casarin (2003). 
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privatisation in September 1992 raised 1/3 of the total privatisation proceeds from the 
sector. The second largest firm Agua y Energia Electrica (AyE) operated 16 generation 
plants, transmission lines and provincial distribution companies. Its privatisation began in 
early 1993 as its power stations were separated and sold off. Hidronor, which operated 
hydro power plants in the Comahue region was privatised in mid 1993. This was 
accompanied by the granting of concessions to operate one national transmission grid 
(Transener) and five regional grids. In 2001 there were more than 40 generation 
companies operating in Argentina and 30 distribution utilities and most were privately 
owned and operated. 
 
The Argentine electricity privatisations raised $3.1bn for the central government and 
associated privatisations by the provinces raised a further $2.1bn. The privatisation drew 
heavily on the experience of privatisation in Chile and the UK, then seen as the pioneers 
of electricity reform of state owned electricity companies in the post-World War II 
period. Thus the design of the market for wholesale power was based on the Chilean 
market which had a cost based bidding system for scheduling power plants and an 
independent system operator (ISO) responsible for dispatch. There were also echoes of 
the Chilean system of seasonal average prices being passed through to regulated 
customers. The large scale break up of the generation sector and the separation of 
generation, transmission and distribution reflected the UK experience from 1990. The 
UK had separated transmission and generation and continued the separation between 
distribution and generation. It was also experiencing problems of having an overly 
concentrated generation market which the Argentine system was at pains to avoid. The 
Argentine model of regulation with the creation of an independent national electricity 
regulator, ENRE, drew on the UK model by investing responsibility for price setting in a 
specialist independent agency with responsibility only for the electricity sector. 
 
The break up of the ownership of the generation sector was accompanied by the creation 
of a Wholesale Electricity Market (MEM). This market covers most of the country (and 
93% of electricity demand) apart from the far south, which has its own non-
interconnected market (MEMSP). The MEMSP supplies 6% of total electricity demand 
with the remaining 1% of power demand supplied by small isolated systems. The MEM 
is managed by a corporation: CAMMESA.16 Its functions are to carry out efficient 
dispatch (via the Dispatch Management Agency – Organismo Encargado del Dispatcho), 
co-ordinate centralised operation and the manage the MEM generally. CAMMESA is a 
not- for profit joint stock company owned by the Association of power generators 
(AGEERA), the Association of large users (AGUERRA), the distributors’ association, 
the association of high voltage transmission companies (ATERRA) and the Secretariat of 
Energy (the responsible government ministry). Each shareholder has 20% of the 
company. CAMMESA has a board of 10 members to which each association appoints 2 
members. The Secretary of Energy (the chief minister of the Secretariat of Energy) is 
another member and the final member is appointed with the assent of three of the 
associations subject to the veto of the Secretary of Energy. Its decisions are made by 
majority voting but must include the Secretary of Energy. In the event of a tie the 
                                                
16 See Rodriguez-Pardina (2004) for details of the governance of CAMMESA. 
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Secretary of Energy’s vote counts as double and in the event of a disagreement the 
Secretary of Energy decides. 
 
The actual power market, which CAMMESA manages, involves a cost based energy 
price determination system.17 Every 6 months (July and December) thermal and nuclear 
generators submit bids for the price at which they are willing to supply energy in every 
hour for next six month period (November to April and May to October). Bids cannot 
exceed 115% of the actual fuel costs incurred by generators in their fuel purchases. They 
can be adjusted within the six month pricing period if fuel prices fluctuate by more than a 
certain percentage. All generating plants are also required to declare availability. Hydro 
generators must declare the value of water in their reservoirs. Using demand forecasts for 
each day CAMMESA determines the marginal plant for each hour of operation during a 
given day (there is no demand side bidding as such). Local prices can develop where 
there are transmission constraints. Generators receive the spot price plus a nodal factor 
and a capacity charge if they are running during the period 6am to 11pm18. This fee was 
fixed at $10 USD per MWh in 1994 and is added to the energy cost of the marginal 
turbine on the system19. Optimal dispatch also takes account of start up costs in the 
system. Fuel costs are subject to verification by CAMMESA, for gas plants the reference 
price is that provided by the national gas company, ENERGAS, for oil the reference price 
is the New York price and coal prices only affect one plant. There were initially four 
emergency tariffs ($120, $170, $240 and $1500 per MWh) which can be set at times of 
shortage. 
 
In 1991 generation was initially in the hands of four major companies with a combined 
market share of 77.3% with the largest company (SEGBA) having a market share of 
23.3%.20 By 2002 there were more companies in the market and the share of the largest 
four largest private companies was 40.5%, with the largest private firm having a market 
share of 12.3%. The energy market was liberalised for customers with demands greater 
than 5MW, this has been successively reduced to 30KW. These customers are free to 
contract directly with generators and can participate directly in the generation ma rket. As 
a result of this liberalisation the number of participants in the MEM was 2527 in 
December 2002 that included 38 generating companies and 2308 large energy users. At 
this time national installed capacity was equal to 23.6 GW. The liberalised market 
accounts for around 50% of national electricity demand. 
 
Electricity transmission charges are paid by generators and suppliers and there is non-
discriminatory right of access to all transmission lines.21 For existing lines these are based 
on regulated tariffs (regulated third party access). Transmission lines are operated under 
95 year concessions subject to management contracts which are renewed every 15 years. 
                                                
17 See Ferreira (2002) for details of the operation of the wholesale power market. 
18 The “Market” node is located at the System Load Centre (the Ezeiza 500 kV node in the Greater Buenos 
Aires/Litoral Area).  In each of the other nodes on the grid the energy price takes into account the cost of 
taking the energy to or from the Market node. 
19 This capacity charge was calculated as the sum of a base price ($5 USD per MWh) and a reliability price 
determined by the Secretariat of Energy (in May 1994 it was set at $5 USD per MWh). 
20 Market data on the MEM and the MEMSP has been supplied by ENRE. 
21 See Vignolo (2000) and Gomez-Ibanez and Rodriguez-Pardina (2001a,b).  
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Transmission charges were to be reviewed every 5 years by ENRE. Transener hold the 
national transmission concession and faced their first five year renewal in 1998, of which 
more detail later.22 The basis of the regulation was to be incentive based regulation of the 
required revenue of the transmission company such the regulated revenue would be fixed 
in real US dollars and subject to an annual efficiency adjustment.23 This approach was 
borrowed from the UK and indeed Transener was part owned by the UK’s National Grid 
Company from 1993 to early 2004. 
 
However Argentina followed a new approach to large transmission expansions: the so 
called ‘Public Contest’ mechanism. 24 Transmission expansion was to be determined by 
negotiated third party access. However, the methodology used to determine the 
“beneficiaries” of a new transmission line and what are the percentage levels of the 
benefits of the various beneficiaries seems to be based on energy usage, rather than on 
economic or market benefits-- once new lines were built payment was to be on the basis 
of energy usage, those whose power went down the line would have to pay for it, 
independently of how the line affected their overall financial position.  Since this 
methodology sets the payments that the “beneficiaries” are required to make towards the 
costs of constructing a new line, predictably significant problems arose from the 
unwillingness of some parties to any more for new facilities than they expect to gain from 
the facilities in economic benefit.  Equally or more significant, is the danger that a 
proposed new line is actually not a worthwhile investment, or not the best choice of an 
investment, or not a well-timed investment.  There is also the allied danger that a 
desirable project would be missed, because those to whom the project might bring the 
most benefit would be unable to pay accordingly for an assured portion of its services. It 
seems that some of these problems arose in the context of the issues surrounding the 
delayed decision to construct a “Fourth Line” which was to bring additional power to 
Buenos Aires from the south which we discuss further below. 
 
Transener was not responsible for system planning merely for operation and maintenance 
of existing lines. Proposals for new lines could be made and subjected to a vote of all the 
effected users. If 30% of the users affected by the new line voted against the line then it 
would not go ahead. This procedure was particularly important when considering major 
transmission lines linking the hydro and gas plants in the south to the load centre in 
Buenos Aires.. Lines approved under this mechanism would be subject to competitive 
tendering. CAMMESA also administered a fund, which collected the transmission 
congestion rents accruing on congested lines (the difference between the prices received 
by constrained generators and the prices paid by constrained custo mers). Contracts for 
specific capacity expansions would be issued when the individual constrained lines had 
collected enough rents to pay for a capacity expansion.  
 
                                                
22 For a discussion of the regulation of Transener see Gomez-Ibanez and Rodriguez-Pardina (2001b). 
23 The efficiency adjustment cannot exceed 1% per annum or cumulatively 5% throughout the review 
period. 
24 For discussions of the transmission expansion regime in Argentina see Abdala and Chambouleyron 
(1999), Gomez-Ibanez and Rodriguez-Pardina (2001c), Gomez-Ibanez and Rodriguez-Pardina (2003) and 
Littlechild and Skerk (2004a, b). 
9 
Electricity distribution in the Greater Buenos Aires area is regulated under concession 
contracts. These asset concession contracts are for 99 years, with prices subject to review 
every 5 years, at which time the distribution tariffs for regulated customers were to be 
reset following assessment by ENRE under the principles of incentive regulation.  Under 
the concession contracts electricity distributors were responsible for bill collection and 
were given strong incentives to reduce energy losses. These were initially very high due 
to a combination of technical inefficiency and theft. Third party access charges to the 
distribution network are not regulated and are subject to negotiated third party access. For 
regulated customers (which include all residential customers, small commercial and small 
industrial customers) the regulated electricity tar iff can be adjusted every three months. 
The basis of this adjustment was the seasonal energy price, which is set every 6 months.25   
 
The seasonal prices are based on estimates of prices calculated by CAMMESA; these can 
be altered after 3 months by the Secretary of Energy if there are significant differences 
between the actual prices and estimated prices within the period. The energy price faced 
by each distribution company is determined according to nodal factors. The capacity 
price faced by distributors is  based on the a fixed monthly payment based on the actual 
power contracted by the distributors during the capacity charging period and the total 
forecast payments during the 6 month period which the generators are due to receive for 
capacity. Final prices for regulated customers were a combination of the seasonal energy 
and capacity charge and transmission and distribution value added charges. Distribution 
charges could be reset every 5 years at the request of the companies but no request came 
in 1997 and so the next opportunity for a price review was to be in 2002. No review has 
yet been conducted following the macroeconomic crisis. Other provinces have their own 
system of regulation of distribution but their distributors pay for energy for regulated 
customers using the same seasonal price formula and most have based the regulation of 
final tariffs on the principles set out in the 1992 Electricity Law. By 2000 around 25% of 
provincial electricity distribution was privatised (e.g. in Cordoba and Mendoza).26 
 
The regulatory agency, ENRE, was made responsible27 for: protecting users rights; 
promoting competition in production and encouragement of long term supply; promotion 
of open access in transmission and distribution; regulation of transmission and 
distribution tariffs; promotion of efficiency and encouraging investment. In contrast to 
the situation in Chile where the activities of the regulatory agencies were sharply 
prescribed ENRE was tasked with producing a large number of regulations to do with: 
security and safety and quality standards and the basis for tariffs and the awarding of 
concessions.28 ENRE was therefore to be left to develop appropriate methodologies to set 
the regulated distribution tariffs and the regulated transmission tariffs. In transmission 
they did  this in the 1998 price control for Transener and were working on the 
methodology of assessment for the distribution companies price review. Between 1992 
and 2001 ENRE issued no less than 131 resolutions concerning the regulation of the 
                                                
25 See Vignolo (2000, pp.11-12). 
26 See Vignolo (2000, p.15). 
27 Law 24,065, Article 2, on Electricity Law Objectives for ENRE. 
28 Law 24,065, Article 56, on Functions and Capabilities of ENRE. 
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electricity sector.29 In 2003 ENRE seemed well resourced with 158 staff, of which 87 
were professional staff (15 were economists). 
 
The governance of the electricity sector in Argentina established in 1992 maintained a 
large role for the Secretary of Energy. 30 He heads the board of CAMMESA and he 
appoints 3 of ENRE’s 5 directors. He monitors the two remaining state owned 
hydroelectric plants (Yacyreta and Salto Grande) and the state owned nuclear power 
company (Nucleo Electrica). He also sits on the Federal Electricity Power Council 
(CFEE) which has responsibility for the management of the National Energy Fund. 
ENRE has responsibility for dispute resolution in the sector but in the event of disputes 
with ENRE the Secretary of Energy arbitrates. The provinces via the Federal Electricity 
Power Council appoint ENRE’s two remaining directors. The Secretariat of Energy has 
majority ownership of the National Transmission Dispatch agency (DNDC) for which 
CAMMESA has the management. 
 
The initial privatisations attracted a large amount of foreign interest with many of the 
firms passing into foreign ownership soon after the initial offering. An estimated 30 
foreign companies have investments in the Argentine electricity sector.31 The generation 
market has seen significant amounts of new entry by foreign utilities and investment by 
incumbent utilities. AES of US, Endesa of Spain and Total Fina Elf of Europe are major 
players in the generation sector. Transener was taken over by an consortium lead by the 
British company, National Grid . In distribution Edesur was taken over initially by Enersis 
of Chile and then Endesa of Spain, Edelap by AES and Edenor by EdF of France. 
Ultimate parent firms do control both distribution and generation companies but usually 
with less than 100% shares in  both companies. 
 
The initial generation market had low a concentration ratio. The market shares of the 
leading firms have increased since 1992 but the market remains less concentrated than 
most European and North American markets. The Herfindahl Hirshman Index of 
concentration (HHI) was 708 in 2002 in terms of energy sold to the wholesale market by 
business unit (though the HHI was 1589 when cross-share holding is accounted for).32 In 
transmission there was a long running attempt to gain approval for a four th major 
transmission line from the Comahue region in the south to Buenos Aires. 33 This line was 
initially proposed in February 1995 with a capacity of 1000 MW at a cost of $200m 
USD. The beneficiaries would have been seven generators in the Comahue region 
supplying Greater Buenos Aires who frequently faced transmission constraints. However 
more than 30% of the pool of beneficiaries voted against the proposal even though a 
social benefit analysis would have indicated that it was clearly in the national interest. 
Eventually a negotiated agreement was reached which involved a much cheaper upgrade 
of the existing lines and a new plan approved in September 1996. The new capacity 
                                                
29 See Rodriguez-Pardina (2004). 
30 See Rodriquez-Pardina (2004). 
31 See CAISE (2002, p.8). 
32 Source: ENRE. ENRE also find that the economic group HHI increases from 1446 in 2000 to 1589 in 
2002. 
33 See Abdala and Chambouleyron (1999). 
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became available in 1998. The problems of the veto system thrown up by the fourth line 
negotiation lead to a radical proposal for a system of transmission capacity rights.34 This 
was approved by the then Secretary of Energy just before the end of the Menem 
government but was never enacted. 
 
There have been two major attempts at revising the 1992 Electricity Act in 1999 
(Resolution 545 of 1999) and in 2001 (Decree 804 of 2001).35 Both of these were 
subsequently overturned and were not put into place. We will make some reference to 
their proposals in what follows. The major event affecting the sector has undoubtedly 
been the macro-economic crisis (and the government reaction to it). Regulated electricity 
tariffs, as we have seen, were pegged to the US dollar. In the February 2002 when the 
peso was allowed to follow freely all prices within the sector were delinked to the US 
currency and fixed in nominal pesos. This has effected the capacity payment in the power 
market, which is the one specified price in the market. The fuel prices from which energy 
prices are calculated have been affected by pesification in the gas market, where the price 
of gas from ENERGAS has been fixed in pesos. This has limited the impact of 
pesification on the peso energy price. Regulated transmission and distribution charges 
have been converted to pesos. The impact of this  on the electricity sector, as in most 
privatised sectors, has been profound. Most electricity companies are showing large 
losses on their original (US dollar based) capital investments, leading to the collapse of 
new investment and significant non-payment risks. These arise from the increase in bad 
debt among final electricity customers and the fact that spot prices for generated 
electricity are not being fully passed through to regulated customers running down the 
reserve funds of CAMMESA and requiring the government to loan CAMMESA 
money. 36  
 
Currently (mid 2004) the concession contracts and final prices are being renegotiated by 
the government but there is no sign of a deal. This inability to reach an agreement to raise 
prices to economic levels has had serious consequences which were easy to predict, 
especially when combined with lower than normal hydroelectric availability. Low 
electricity prices have led to a rapid growth in electricity demand. Underlying demand 
growth is running at 8.7% p.a. and July 2004 total was 6% above the pre-crisis monthly 
peak (December 2000). 37 Since the beginning of the year capacity shortages have led to 
cuts in supply to industrial consumers. In April there was a serious power loss in the 
Buenos Aires area which led to the ne twork operating at lower than normal voltage. In 
March the government unilaterally cut gas supplies to Chile by 15%38 in order to raise the 
                                                
34 See Gomez-Ibanez and Rodriguez-Pardina (2001c). 
35 See Rodreguez-Pardina (2002). 
36 The government had loaned CAMMESA around $250m by July 2004 in order to compensate generators 
for the difference between what distributors are paying in respect of regulated customers and spot prices 
(See ‘Argentina Grants Electric Grid Operator New ARS300M Loan’, Dow Jones International News, 2 
August 2004). 
 
37 Source: CAMMESA website. 
38 This action violated the 1995 Energy Integration Treaty between the two countries. This treated states 
that supplies can only be cut in proportion to the energy shortage within Argentina. This would have 
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amount of gas available for consumption in domestic power plants and exports of 
electricity to neighbouring countries have been restricted. Such actions have not 
addressed the fundamental problems facing the sector since the crisis but have served to 
worsen international relations in the region. 39 Economists now estimate that Argentina’s 
growth rate will be up to 2% lower as a result of the shortage of electricity. 40 
 
The government has announced a package of measures aimed at addressing the energy 
crisis.41 This included a timetable to raise the industrial price of electricity to the 
competitive level within 18 months (prices have already begun to rise) and an incentive 
scheme for domestic users of electricity. The incentive scheme will see the marginal price 
of electricity rise by 50% for units in excess of 95% of the previous year’s consumption. 
These measures for part of the ‘Integral Energy Plan’, published in May 2004, which 
includes price rises for domestic natural gas and plans for a state energy company to 
facilitate investments in fuel production and transportation infrastructure. There are also 
suggestions that the state may invest in new hydroelectric and nuclear facilities. 
 
The magnitude of the macro-economic shock makes it difficult to believe that the 
majority of the problems experienced by the sector since February 2002 could have easily 
been avoided. However the inaction of the government does seem to have prolonged the 
financial stress of the electricity sector and led to operational problems which could have 
been avoided. Our review of the lessons from the Argentine electricity reform will mainly 
focus on the lessons of the period 1992 to 2001. 
 
 
3. The Performance of the Argentine Electricity Sector since 1992 
 
In this section we report some indicators of performance of the sector over the reform 
period. The areas, which we look at, are those that relate most directly to the social 
welfare effects of the reform and those indicators that are most important in a developing 
country context. Detailed information can be found in the information appendices. There 
are some papers, which attempt to measure the overall welfare effects of the Argentine 
                                                                                                                                            
implied a 5% cut in gas supplies (See ‘What sort of neighbour is this?’, The Economist, 15th May 2004, 
p.34). 
39 Restricted Argentine gas supplies have led Chile switch to expensive fuel oil for electricity generation 
and have put pressure on its transmission network as changing plant availability have reconfigured power 
flows across its power grid. Argentina has agreed to import more gas from Bolivia. However the Bolivians 
have an old border dispute with Chile which has led them to stipulate that none of the extra imports be used 
to increase the flow of gas to Chile. (See The Economist, 15th May 2004, op.cit.) 
40 See Adam Thomson, ‘Argentina’s lights grow dim as energy crisis hits home’, Financial Times, 5th April 
2004, p.7. 
41 The crisis applies to the gas sector as well, where low gas prices have encouraged switching of cars from 
gasoline to natural gas. Up to 30,000 cars a month are being converted to use gas. This has exacerbated the 
shortage of gas for electricity generation (See ‘The laws of economics bite back’, The Economist, 24th April 
2004, p.35). For details of the ‘Integral Energy Plan’ see  
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privatisation program (including electricity). These studies do find significant overall 
welfare benefits from privatisation. 42 
 
3.1 Investment 
 
Between the beginning of 1992 and the end of 2002 the installed capacity in the main 
MEM system expanded from 13,267 MW to 22,831 MW (4.9% p.a.). The capacity of the 
MEMSP system was only 778 MW at the end of 2002. The reserve margin was 46% at 
the peak in 2002 (highest demand divided by available capacity). The expansion of 
generation capacity was achieved by privately owned operators and while keeping prices 
low. The number of units delivered increased by 45800 GWh to 72106 GWh from 1992 
to 2002 (4.6%). The total investment was around $7.5bn in fixed assets between 1992 
and 2002.43 
 
In transmission the route length of transmission lines in the main MEM system expanded 
from 16,958 kM to 22,140 kM (2.7% p.a.) between 1992 and 2002. 44 In distribution the 
total number of electricity customers was 9.835m in 2001. Of these the number in the two 
largest SEGBA successor companies was 4.34m in 2002, this was an increase of 11% 
from 1993. This includes the effects an ambitious plan to connect 650,000 shanty town 
households to the electricity network between 1994 and 1998 via collective meters that 
achieved its objectives over the period. 
 
By the standards of other developing countries this is a very good investment record. 
 
3.2 Prices 
 
Currently electricity prices in Argentina are the lowest in Latin America and extremely 
low by world standards. 45 In May 2002 residential tariffs were just 2.5 US cents per kWh 
for a residential consumer compared with 9.8 cents a kWh in the US, while industrial 
tariffs were a mere 1.3 cents per kWh (against 5.9 cents in the US). This reflects the 
effect of pesification on the sector. Prior to the crisis the comparable prices were 8.9 
cents and 4.8 cents per kWh. These prices reflected the significant amount of hydro in the 
Argentine generation mix (33% of total capacity) and the efficiency improvements seen 
in the generation sector since 1992. 
 
Figures 5 to 8 show the evolution of tariffs in the Greater Buenos Aires Area compared 
with those under SEGBA.46 It is clear that the pricing mechanism eliminated the large 
fluctuations in the real value of tariffs seen in the 1980s. It also lead to a fall in the 
average real tariff from 9.1 cents per kWh to 6.4 cents per kWh (29%). Figure 6 shows 
that this fall is almost entirely explained by the fall in the cost of wholesale power in the 
                                                
42 See for example: Delfino and Cesarin (2003), Chisari et al. (1999) and Benitez et al. (2003). The latter 
two papers also show that effective regulation wh ich transfers benefits to consumers reasonably quickly 
will significant raise the benefits from privatisation. 
43 Source: CAISE (2002, p.4). 
44 CAMMESA Annual Report 2002, p.74. 
45 See CAISE (2002, p.15) for evidence on the impact of crisis on relative tariffs. 
46 Figures are taken from Devoto and Cardozo (2002). 
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MEM, where as Figure 7.1 shows the nominal US dollar price of energy fell 70% pre-
crisis. Figure 7.2 also shows the government’s political problem: the real peso price of 
electricity is almost constant comparing before and after the crisis. This implies that 
raising the price of electricity to reflect international prices of gas and to recover rates of 
return on investment will necessitate sharp relative price rises for electricity. While 
industrial customers benefited disproportionately from the falls in the wholesale price 
pre-crisis Figure 8 shows that the average captive customer saw their price decline from 
9.1 cents to 7.8 cents per kWh (14%). Though among captive customers the smallest 
residential (making up around 38% of total customers) customers on Tariff T1-R1 saw 
their prices rise by 25%. 
 
3.3 Financial Performance 
 
The low price of electricity and high rates of investment in the sector prior to 2002 were 
accompanied by strong financial performance by the companies involved. Financial 
performance in the SEGBA had been very poor prior to its reorganisation. After 
privatisation the average post-tax rates of return on shareholders’ funds in generation 
were 4.6% in 2000 47, though they appear to have been higher in previous years. And in 
transmission Transener’s post tax rate of return on equity was 6.8% in 2000.48 Among the 
distribution companies rates of return on equity were rather higher: Edenor and Edesur 
earned post tax rate of returns on equity of 10.9% and 9.5% in 200049. These rates of 
return are respectable by international standards but look low given the country risk 
associated with Argentina. In Transener’s price control review of 1998 the country risk 
premium was estimated to be 4.89%p.a. in real terms. 50 It seems clear that investors were 
not getting this return in generation before the crisis. One can therefore question whether 
financial performance was satisfactory in this period and whether investors original 
investment levels were rational given subsequent returns. 
 
The macro-economic crisis has caused returns to fall in 2002. Electricity prices fixed in 
pesos, while most debts were denominated in US dollars51. This resulted in widespread 
defaulting on debt payments and significant losses of shareholder value. Transener had a 
loss of 121% on shareholders equity. 52 This reflected a sharp decline in income as a result 
of the crisis and exchange rate losses on debts. Distribution companies also posted big 
losses.53 Edenor had a 30% loss on start of year shareholders’ equity in 2002 and Edesur 
had financial losses amounting to 13% of start of year shareholders’ equity. 54 Generation 
                                                
47 Net income divided by Net Worth for a sample of four generation companies (Central Puerto, Central 
Termoelectrica Buenos Aires, Central Costanera and Central Termica Guemes). Data taken from accounts  
and summary financial statements available at www.cnv.gov.ar.  
48 Net income divided by Shareholders’ Equity  (see Transener Annual Report 2001, p.3). 
49 Net income divided by Shareholders’ Equity (see Edenor Financial Statement 2003, English Translation, 
p.44 and Edesur Annual Report 2003, p.39). 
50 See Gomez-Ibanez and Rodriguez-Pardina (2001b, p.13). 
51 External debts of the electricity sector were $4.3bn at the end of 2001 (CAISE, 2002, p.21).  
52 Transener Annual Report and Financial Statements 2002, p.69. 
53 Estache (2004) discusses the theoretical effects of pesification combined with a tariff freeze on 
distribution company profits. 
54 Edenor Annual Report and Financial Statement 2002, p.2. 
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companies announced significant losses for 2002.55 Foreign currency investors saw the 
foreign currency value of their remaining shareholder funds decline by at least two thirds. 
The UK’s National Grid sold its stake in Transener for less than 10% of its pre-crisis 
investment value in March 2004.56 Electricity firms pointed out that at current price 
levels new investment was not profitable and supply shortages were likely in the near 
term if low prices continued (CAISE, 2002). 
 
3.4 Efficiency Improvements 
 
The falls in prices and moderate rates of return reflect large efficiency improvements in 
the industry. Employment in SEGBA and its successor companies fell, from 21,535 in 
1987/90 to 7,945 in 1997, a fall of 63%. 57 This overall improvement reflects a large 
decrease in generation plant unavailability from over 50% to around 20% in just 5 years 
as well as labour efficiency improvements in both generation and distribution.58 
 
Figure 9 shows the sharp improvement in generation plant availability. Figure 10 shows 
that labour productivity in Endesa Argentina (the second largest generator in 2002) 
improved from 13 to 35 GWh generated per employee between 1995 and 2000. Figure 11 
shows sales per employee in the two largest distribution companies improved from less 
than 2 GWh in 1993 per employee to 5.7 GWh per employee in 2001. These numbers 
compare very favourably with experience in the UK where labour productivity improved 
by less over a longer period.59 
 
3.5 Shanty Town Electrification 
 
A notable initial success in Argentina has been the regularisation of connections and 
payment for the large numbers of shanty town dwellers in the Greater Buenos Aires 
area.60 Beginning in 1994 the central government embarked on an ambitious plan to put 
in regular metered electricity connections to shanty town areas. The three incumbent 
electricity companies were given capital subsidies to connect the poor customers and did 
so at a very rapid rate. By end of 1998 650,000 new customers had been added under this 
                                                
55 Total Fina Elf report a 431m Euros loss in Argentina in 2002 (Total Fina 2002 Form 20-F), Endesa 
Argentina a $454m loss in 2002 (Endesa Annual Report 2002, p.72-3). 
56 ‘LATIN AMERICA: National Grid to exit Argentina's Transener with sale to local fund’, Platts Global 
Power Report, 25 March 2004. 
57 See Ennis and Pinto (2002, p.50). 
58 Benitez et al. (2003, p.4) report electricity generation and distribution efficiency gains from date of 
transfer until 1999: the reduction in the share of intermediate purchases as a share of gross value added fell 
by 17.2%, while in distribution the figure fell by 5.5%. In terms of labour productivity, GWh per employee 
rises by 17.4% for generators and by 31.5% for distribution companies over the period from transfer date to 
1999. 
59 Newbery and Pollitt (1997) find that for the CEGB (responsible for generation and transmission of 
electricity in England and Wales labour productivity increased from 4.7 GWh generated per employee to 
10.4 GWh  generated per employee over the period 1985-86 to 1995-96. Domah and Pollitt (2001) found 
that in the distrib ution and supply businesses of the 12 regional electricity companies in England and Wales 
labour productivity increased from 2.5 GWh sales per employee in 1985-86 to 5.5 GWh sales per employee 
in 1997-98. 
60 See Bouile et al. (2002). 
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scheme. The percentage of the poorest income decile households in Greater Buenos Aires 
area with electricity had risen to 99% in 1996/97 from 65% in 1985/86.61 This had a 
positive impact on the social welfare of these households as they often wanted electricity 
for heating and for pumping water. Non-payment was reduced as payments were 
regularised and as local governments began to pay for the very poorest customers usually 
via municipal meters which recorded aggregate consumption for up to 1000 households. 
 
3.6 Quality of Supply 
 
Quality of supply has improved overall within the Argentine electricity sector since 1992. 
Technical and non-technical losses have fallen sharply. The reduction in losses is shown 
in Figure 12. For the utilities in the Greater Buenos Aires area the number of hours of 
supply lost per year was 21 in 1988, 16.8 in 1993/94 and dropped to 5 in 2000/01.62 This 
reflects significant improvement in metering and bill collection to reduce non-technical 
losses (i.e. theft). However it is worth noting that the recent macroeconomic crisis has 
been accompanied by a small upturn in the measured losses, possibly due to a 
combination of increased theft, under-investment and fundamental supply shortage. 
 
Power outages in the transmission system have fallen since privatisation. In the Transener 
transmission system the rate of own failures per year was 1.48 in July 1994 and was 0.57 
in 2002 well below the limit of 2.50 set in the concession contract.63 
 
3.7 Major Problems 
 
The Argentine electricity system has operated successfully at the national level for the 12 
years since the restructuring of the state owned system. This is in spite of the recent 
macro-economic crisis, which has disrupted the basis of the payment arrangements within 
the sector. The most serious problem the system has actually had was the infamous 
Edesur incident in 1999. 64 This was a serious power blackout in the city of Buenos Aires, 
which was handled badly by the private company involved and did much to damage the 
local reputation of privatisation. The incident shares some similarities with the Auckland 
Crisis of February 1998 when the centre of Auckland was without power for three weeks. 
 
During the early morning of February 15 there was a fire in a new substation as it was 
being energised. This resulted in 156,540 customers being without power. By that night 
60,000 customers were still without power. It was not until February 24 that the last 
customer was reconnected. The situation was poorly handled by Edesur, who continually 
promised that the problem would be solved imminently. The blackout occurred during 
some of the hottest days of the summer and lead to street protests. Edesur compounded 
the bad impression left by the incident by their subsequent initial reluctance to fully  
indemnify losses. Eventually a fine of $51m dollars was imposed on the company by the 
                                                
61 See Ennis and Pinto (2002, p.30). 
62 See CAISE (2002, p.17). 
63 See Transener Annual Report 2002, p.21. 
64 For a full description and analysis of the incident, see Ullberg (2002). 
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regulator because of the seriousness of the blackout and the total cost after compensation 
payouts reached around $80m. 
 
Since then there have been other serious incidents but these have not attracted the same 
level of fine as the Edesur incident.65 There have also been suggestions that recent power 
outages caused by shortage of capacity have been caused by strategic under-investment 
by electricity companies in generation, transmission and distribution. There seems little 
evidence of strategic under- investment but plenty of evidence that prices are much too 
low to justify any additional investment in capacity to increase quantity or quality of 
supply. 
 
4. Detailed Lessons from the Reforms of the Argentine Electricity Sector 
 
We discuss the reforms in detail looking at the issues under five headings: generation, 
transmission, distribution and retailing, practice of regulation and general institutional 
framework. In our view the picture that emerges is one a system which has worked well 
and significant benefits since its inception. In 1992, the design of the electricity market 
drew on best practice design experience at the time. In the 2003 the system continues to 
function well in spite of an enormous macro-economic shock. We examine the Argentine 
experience in the light of best practice as it currently stands. To summarise these under 
each of our five headings: 
 
A. Generation markets work best when characterised by a lack of integration with 
monopoly transmission and distribution networks, low degrees of concentration in the 
price setting segment of the market and when generators freely contract with 
customers. 
B. Transmission systems need appropriate regulation of incumbents to ensur e both fair 
prices and an adequate rate of return on investment. In a relatively well developed 
transmission network there needs to be some institution charged with proposing and 
overseeing system wide planning to ensure timely building of new transmission links. 
C. Distribution companies need to be regulated to ensure that distribution charges both 
incentivise efficiency and are fair. Third party access charge regulation is essential to 
ensure efficient financial bypass of the distribution network by customers free to 
choose supplier. Supply competition is itself feasible for all industrial and commercial 
customers and has been successfully implemented for residential customers in some 
countries. 
D. Economic regulation of the electricity sector is best practised by a single independent 
regulatory agency with minimal ministerial control. Statutory duties to ensure 
adequate planning of future demands in the sector can be effectively delegated to this 
body. Output based regulation using appropriate quasi-market mecha nisms can deal 
with issues of quality of supply, network extension and consumer cross-subsidy 
which are the areas most subject to political interference.  
E. The general institutional environment in which the electricity sector is placed must be 
stable and foster long-term investment based on protection from arbitrary changes in 
                                                
65 See for example ‘Government could fine Edensor for power cuts’, Business News Americas,  3 February 
2004. 
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government policy. Legislation regarding the electricity sector should by credible and 
sustainable. However there should be the capacity for the regulation regarding the 
system to respond to new information. The ability of the regulator and the 
Independent System Operator (ISO) to do this requires clear and quick dispute 
resolution/review mechanisms especially in the case of disputes between companies 
and the regulatory agency. Given the technical nature of many of the issues this 
should involve specialist arbitration panels perhaps under the authority of the general 
Competition Agency. 
 
4.1 The Generation Sector 
 
The Argentine electricity system illustrates the potential for larger developing 
countries to operate competitive power markets. Argentina’s power market has 
successfully delivered low prices and reasonable rates of return for investors prior to the 
macro-economic crisis. There have been no problems of the strategic exploitation of 
market power due to both the cost based bidding system and the degree of competition in 
the market which has meant that generators have in general not even bid up energy prices 
to the maximum price allowed for their technology. 66 There has been significant new 
entry and so far the market share of the largest four firms has remained lower than in 
1991. The system of independent system of operation and dispatch has worked well and 
supported the market. 
 
The vertical separation of electricity generation fro m both transmission and 
distribution created a vigorous competitive market for industrial customers. 
Argentina learnt well the negative lessons from Chile about the need to separate 
electricity generation from both transmission and distribution. In Chile the continued 
integration of Endesa generation and transmission combined with negotiated third party 
access created hold up problems for other generators. This has not been a problem in 
Argentina where generation and transmission are legally separate. Similarly in Chile 
integration of Endesa generation and Chilectra distribution has made it difficult for other 
generators to compete for large customers embedded within the Chilectra distribution 
network. In Argentina these hold -up problems did not exist and there have been no 
incentives for distribution companies to prevent efficient financial bypass of their 
network. The result has been a very competitive market for free customers, where a 
significant percentage have left their local distribution company in the Greater Buenos 
Aires area. 
 
Price based bidding could have worked in Argentina whereas the actual cost 
bidding system was flawed.  There is little evidence of market power being exercised in 
the generation market, this may have been because of the way the capacity payment was 
paid. Generators did not get capacity payments for availability, as theory would suggest. 
Instead they received capacity payments when they were actually running during the non-
valley hours. This gave generators an incentive to underbid on their energy cost in order 
                                                
66 Ferreira (2002) finds that firms are not exploiting any market power within the Chilean market at the end 
of 2000. The prices which prevail in the market are equal to those which a social planner would choose if 
she were determining which plants were dispatched. 
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to ensure that they got to run their generating plants. This may have lead to plants 
running out of merit order and could easily have been corrected by given capacity 
payments for availability. An alternative approach would  have been closer auditing of 
energy costs. 
 
The Argentine energy market was very competitive unlike that in Chile, where 
simulations suggest that price based bidding would have lead to much higher prices.67 It 
is clear that a price based bidding system could have worked under the competitive 
situation of the Argentine market. Price based bidding systems, in theory, provide better 
signals for long term investment as dispatch is on the basis of the scarcity value of 
electricity rather than on the basis of current costs. Such a system would have reduced the 
transaction costs and scope for cost based gaming in the current system. The gains from 
switching to this system would initially have been small but might have provided less 
scope for government interference. It is interesting to note that the proposed reform in 
1999 (Resolution 545) did include a provision for day ahead price based bidding in the 
energy market68; the 2001 reform also included a provision for a move to price based 
bidding.69 
 
The long term contract market was negatively affected by the seasonal price that 
distribution companies paid for power. Distribution companies could only pass 
through the seasonal price of electricity, which was an expectation of the spot price. This 
left little scope for a meaningful long-term contract market between generators and 
distributors. Distributors would never wish to pay a price higher than the seasonal market 
and on average generators would only be interested in long term contracting if they could 
get a price gr eater than the average spot price. In the situation when the spot price was 
falling, as it was for most of the 1990s, distributors would be happy to purchase power 
spot. The absence of long term contracts is worrying in that long term contracting and 
price signals reduce the future supply shortages by providing signals of future scarcity. A 
lack of long term contracting in the Californian electricity market was one of the key 
reasons for the financial problems experienced by electricity distribution companies 
during the 2000-01 power crisis. 70 The unwillingness of distributors to sign long term 
contracts in the context of a developing country with high and variable demand growth 
can expose the sector to unnecessary power shortage risks. 
 
Recent increases in concentration in generation and mergers between distribution 
and generation are worrying. The initial structure of the Argentine market in terms of 
horizontal and vertical disintegration was extremely favourable to the operation of a 
successful liberalised market. Recently concentration has been allowed to increase in the 
generation market, partly because of the need to improve the financial viability of 
generating companies in the macro-economic crisis via merger. For example, AES has 
been selling generation assets to Total Fina, the largest generator. Edelap, the smallest of 
the distribution companies in Greater Buenos Aires, is part of the AES group.  
                                                
67 See Arellano (2003). 
68 For the text of this resolution see http://infoleg.mecon.gov.ar/  
69 For the text of this decree see http://infoleg.mecon.gov.ar/  
70 See Sweeney (2002). 
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There is a lot of cross shareholding across generation and distribution. EdF now has share 
holdings in Edenor and in some hydro power plants and Endesa of Spain has 
shareholdings in Edesur and Endesa Argentina (in generation). Such mergers have been 
motivated partly by the macro-economic crisis, which has reduced the price of electricity 
assets for foreign owned companies and allowed them to acquire assets cheaply. It has 
also been motivated by incentives to improve quality of supply on distribution companies 
who can reduce the penalties for failures in the transmission system by investing in 
nearby generation. Such changes in market structure will hamper the operation of both 
the market for wholesale power, increasing the potential for market power and lessening 
the benefits of a move to price based bidding. It will also reduce the effectiveness of 
competition for free customers embedded within distribution networks. 
 
Recent changes in the nature of the bidding and payment rules of the power market 
have been arbitrary and unnecessary. The crisis has led a number of attempts by the 
Secretary of State to reduce the payments crisis problems within the electricity sector by 
interfering with the way the market price is determined. Such moves have had incentive 
properties and threaten the orderly nature of trading observed in the market since 1992.  
 
One example of an arbitrary change was to remove fuel oil plants from the calculation of 
the system marginal price. Thus the merit order was determined as normal but only the 
most expensive fuel oil plants on the system receive the true system marginal prices, 
other plants received the lower price which would have prevailed in the absence of the 
fuel oil plants being required. This change had the effect of reducing the amount of 
money required to pay the generators within the context of fixed regulated prices. These  
sorts of interventions do not change the overall revenue going in to the sector but change 
the distribution of that revenue between generators and distributors. 
 
4.2 The Transmission Sector 
 
The system of regulated third party access charges for existing transmi ssion lines 
did successfully ensure the revenue adequacy of the transmission operator. In 
contrast to Chile there were no problems of non-payment for particular existing lines in 
Argentina. Transener received enough revenue during the pre-crisis period to meet its 
concession obligations and to improve the quality of its service. There was no problem of 
poor incentives to maintain certain sections of the network which were not being properly 
remunerated.71 
 
The system of competitive tendering for new lines was successful. As in Chile, where 
a similar system exists, Argentina obliged all new public transmission investments above 
$2m to be competitively tendered. This implied that the incumbent transmission 
companies did not have a monopoly on new lines in their areas. Between1992 and 1997 
there were four competitive tenders for nearly 2000 km of new lines. The first three 
attracted new entrants, the final one was won by Transener. Littlechild and Skerk (2004a) 
                                                
71 See Gomez-Ibanez and Rodriguez-Pardina (2001b). 
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note that these tendering processes seem to have been competitive and have led to 
significantly reduced construction costs. 
 
The Argentine system implemented an untried model of transmission expansion, 
which proved controversial. The ‘Public Contest’ mechanism of transmission system 
expansion was accused of being biased against investment in transmission. This was 
because if new lines were built every one who used the line would have to pay for it 
independently of how it affected their net revenues. If 30% of users objected on the basis 
of this charging mechanism then it would not go ahead. If the line was built under a direct 
contract between a transmision company and beneficiaries of the line there were other 
potential problems (this was the ‘Contract between Parties’ method). In this case as  new 
line access rights would belong to those who paid for the line, it might be worthwhile to 
free-ride on the initial investment of others. This is because new users of the line might 
be able to pay just marginal usage costs.  
 
The building of the fourth line from the  Comahue to Buenos Aires illustrates the 
controversial nature of the ‘Public Contest’ mechanism for building new lines.72 Seven 
generators were due to benefit from the line in terms of energy benefits. However two of 
the generators were closer to Buenos Aires than the others. This meant that they were 
able to benefit from higher nodal prices when the line from further away from Buenos 
Aires was constrained. The new line would have relieved the transmission constraint 
facing the other 5 generators but reduced the local energy price facing the first 2 
generators. Hence these two generators voted against it. They were joined by some 
distributors who did not want the amount of power that they bought from further away 
from Buenos Aires to increase. This was because they would not benefit from the 
reduced price of power (as this was passed through to customers) but they would face 
higher risk of transmission system failure and associated supply failures. In theory side 
payments were possible but in practice companies were very unlikely to pay them given 
that exerting political pressure to change the system was always an alternative to actually 
making such payments. 
 
The failure to initially agree on the building of the fourth line has been seen by many in 
the industry as evidence that the ‘Public Contest’ mechanism was flawed. Proposals for 
National Transmission Plan were a promoted as a consequence of the perceived problems 
with the ‘Public Contest’ mechanism. However Littlechild and Skerk (2004a) suggest 
that the evidence for such a position is weak. In particular they find that at best the 
decision to build the line was a marginal one. The line was eventually built some 18 
months later than under the initial proposal. This implies that even if the benefits were 
positive the costs of delay were small. They also make the important observation that the 
voting system was successful in reducing the number of unnecessary transmission 
investments motivated by political interests. This had been a problem prior to 
privatisation, as regional governments lobbied for upgraded transmission links paid for 
by the system as a whole (and has re-emerged as a problem recently). Littlechild and 
                                                
72 For details of the negotiations around the building of the fourth line see Abadala and Chambouleyron 
(1999) and Littlechild and Skerk (2004a). For proposals for alternative negotiation mechanisms see also 
Chisari, Dal-Bo and Romero (2001). 
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Skerk also note that a delay of a year and a half is small compared to delays in the 
planning process for major transmission upgrades in Europe and North America. 
 
A system of system wide planning is desirable and necessary in a developing country 
context. In a developing country large and timely transmission expansions are important 
to meet the demands of electrification and rapid economic growth. In advanced countries 
with very low demand growth nodal pricing on the meshed transmission network may be 
a good way to price existing transmission capacity and may give good signals for 
transmission expansion along existing pathways. In developing countries with linear 
transmission systems merchant transmission expansion may be successful, as it generally 
was in Chile. This is because loop flows do not complicate the allocation of benefits. 
Such systems are unlikely to work well in rapidly growing meshed systems. 
 
System wide planning in a meshed system is useful for identifying transmission 
expansions that should go ahead especially in the light of expected rather than actual 
demand growth. In Argentina it would seem sensible that one institution is charged with 
producing a transmission expansion plan and given some power to commission new 
lines. Allowing private companies alone to decide on transmission lines with important 
implications for the location of future economic development (and significant loop flow 
effects) is unlikely to lead to socially optimal (or indeed politically acceptable) outcomes. 
The case of the fourth line from Comahue to Buenos Aires, discussed above, illustrates 
this. Although the decision may have been marginal on economic grounds it would seem 
sensible to have a system which is, if anything, biased slightly towards transmission 
expansion, rather than against it. In suggesting this it is important to stress that the power 
to plan and implement transmission investments can be separated from the actual 
building of new lines. Incentives need to be in place to ensure that the system planner 
does not benefit unduly from over expansion of the transmission network and that alleged 
wider social benefits are evaluated systematically. 
 
The current proposal for a National Transmission Plan to be produced by 
Transener needs to build in effective regulatory oversight of proposals.  The 
problems raised by the building of the fourth line have lead the government to propose a 
National Transmission Plan which does provide for system wide planning lead by 
Transener. Indeed in December 2003 a plan for certain named transmission investments 
was approved (Law 25822). A regular national plan needs effective regulation to avoid 
being biased in favour of too much investment. Proposals need to be audited to ensure 
that they are necessary and effective incentives need to be put in place to ensure that new 
lines are built at least possible cost. The danger in the context of Argentina is that unless 
these are genuinely independently regulated the process of approval of transmission 
investments will become unduly politicised. This could lead to speculative expansions of 
the transmission network to politically valuable regions and with the costs being spread 
among all customers. 
 
In the UK, centralised planning of capacity expansions is carried out by Transener’s 
former parent company, National Grid, and capacity expansions are subject to external 
audit by consulting engineers commissioned by the energy regulator, OFGEM, as part of 
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the 5 year regulatory review process. Some equivalent process, with appropriate 
provision for the objective valuation of regional development benefits, should be required 
in Argentina under a centralised planning system. Worryingly, the current transmission 
investment law specifically exempts the proposed investments from regulatory review. 
 
The regulation of Transener was subject to political interference and did not work 
well. There were problems with both the setting of the regulated revenue for Transener 
during the 1998 price review. 73 ENRE had responsibility for carrying out the review and 
carried out a detailed assessment of Transener’s cost requirements. They concluded that 
Transener should face a significant revenue reduction and rebalancing of its charges. 
Transener subsequently appealed the ENRE decision to the Secretary of Energy. The 
government minister overturned the ENRE decision and increased the regulated charges. 
This process of events involved considerable lobbying of the Secretary of Energy by 
Transener and was not good for the cause of independent regulation in Argentina. 
Transener was the first price review it conducted and it worked hard to do a thorough job. 
The regulatory process should have involved the possibility of an appeal to the 
Competition Commission not to a politician.  However for this to be effective the 
regulatory institutions (including the Competition Commission) need to be subject to 
reduced political interference. We discuss this further in section 4.5. 
 
4.3 The Distribution and Retailing Sector 
 
There is a need for a proper regulation of the third party access charge in order to 
correctly regulate the access to the monopoly distribution network by third party 
suppliers. In a competitive retail electricity market proper regulation of third party 
distribution system access charge is essential. This charge needs to be set in such a way 
as to encourage efficient financial bypass of the distribution network. In theory this 
should be a component of the regulation of final electricity tariffs to regulated customers. 
As ENRE is the regulatory body responsible for regulating these tariffs, it should also be 
responsible for setting the distribution access charge. However access charge is currently 
set by the Secretary of State. As there is not proper accounting separation of distribution 
and supply it is not clear what is the basis of Secretary’s decision. The suggestion is that 
the access charge has been too low since 1992 encouraging inefficient financial bypass 
by free customers which results in regulated customers having to pick up the short fall in 
distribution revenue created. 
 
The current system is subject to both political interference and double jeopardy caused by 
the fact that both the regulator and the Secretary need to work out the efficient level of 
marginal costs in order to make their determinations and hence may use different 
numbers. The result of this will be to raise the uncertainty facing the revenue of the 
distribution company and likelihood of mis-pricing. The political pressure on the 
Secretary of Energy is for lower access charges for large free customers, allowing this in 
turn produces politically difficult pressure on the price paid by regulated residential 
customers. If it is the regulatory agency’s task to regulate the profitability of the 
distribution company then it should have control over both the final price and the access 
                                                
73 See Gomez-Ibanez and Rodriguez-Pardina (2001b) for the history of this price review. 
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charge. The access charge should be set according to the well-known Efficient 
Component Pricing Rule (ECPR). 74 
 
Final Price flexibility is required if the access charge is kept below the efficient level 
in order to stimulate competition in the liberalised market. If an essentially political 
decision is taken to keep distribution access charges below the ECPR level then the 
distribution utility needs to compensated for the loss of revenue. Prices to the remaining 
captive customers should be allowed to rise in order to allow revenue adequacy of the 
distribution company. The issue here is that the regulated firm should be given 
opportunity to rebalance its charges in order to allow it to maintain its pre-determined 
revenue stream. The suggestion is that the current charging mechanism is biased against 
distribution companies being able to maintain their regulated revenue. 
 
Private ownership of distribution utilities combined with clear incentives to increase 
connection of poor customers can dramatically improve access among the poorest 
households. One of the striking achievements of the early years of Argentine electricity 
reform was the sharp increase in the number of poor households with electricity supply.75 
Between 1986/7 and 1996/7 electricity access rose from 65.2% for the poorest decile in 
the Greater Buenos Aires area to 98.98%. This was the result of the 4-year framework 
agreement following privatisation which saw government incentives paying off past debts 
of shanty town dwellers and paying for the installation of meters. Municipal governments 
paid for this with 60% of the tax on household electricity consumption, the other 40% 
subsidised new connections. For the new customers Edenor and Edesur had an 85% 
collection rate with some direct subsidy coming from the government in the form of 
payment for very poor groups of consumers on municipal meters and payments for 
pensioners collecting the minimum pension.  
 
Many developing countries face problems of improving the access of the poorest while 
giving financial incentives to companies to supply them. Argentina handled this problem 
in an economically efficient way. The increase of access to poor consumers was 
calculated to have yielded large increases in social welfare and be a significant benefit of 
the restructuring of the sector. 
 
In contrast to its success in connecting poor urban consumers, the government has 
limited success in extending the electricity network to include 2-3 million 
inhabitants of rural areas without access to electricity. In 1995 the Secretary of 
Energy launched a scheme to supply power to these areas.76 The Disseminated 
Population Electricity Supply Program (PAEPRA) was to connect 314,000 rural users. 
Only of a fraction of those connections were actually put in by 1999. The main problem 
for the PAEPRA was the unwillingness of provincial governments to contribute subsidy 
payments. This now being addressed. 
 
                                                
74 For details see Armstrong, Cowan and Vickers (1994). 
75 See Bouille et al. (2002) and Ennis and Pinto (2002) for discussions about the nature of the government’s 
support for shanty town dwellers and the impact of privatisation on access to electricity. 
76 See Bouille et al. (2002). 
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The system of penalties for supply outages combined with the pass through of nodal 
prices to customers has created perverse incentives for distribution companies. 
Distribution companies are directly liable for all failures to supply their customers 
regardless of the cause. In theory, where prices are not regulated, this should not matter 
for efficient investment in reducing the risk of supply failures. However in practice there 
are high transaction costs in writing supply quality contracts between transmission 
operators and distribution companies and a lack of incentive to minimise the total costs of 
electricity supply facing distribution companies. These two facts mean that distribution 
companies have had a strong incentive to minimise the risk of transmission failure by 
contracting with generators who are close by or even to engage in physical bypass of 
existing transmission networks. This may lead to under-utilisation of some parts of the 
transmission network and pass through of higher nodal power costs to customers. 
 
The seasonal pricing system is unnecessary, inefficient and creates an opportunity 
for political interference. 50% of electricity demand is subject to the seasonal price for 
purchased power. The purpose of this price is to reduce the exposure of residential 
customers to price spikes, which might exist in a hydro system in years of extremely 
unfavourable hydrological conditions. This is misconceived. In a completely free market, 
customers who value price stability can buy stable prices direct from their suppliers who 
will then absorb or re-insure against the risks of high spot prices. In other words long 
term contracts (which allow recovery of a surplus in periods of low spot prices to 
compensate for losses in periods of high spot prices) can be entered into if valued by 
customers. The problem when there are regulated customers who have only one supplier 
is how to encourage the optimal amount of price smoothing.  
 
The Argentine system (like the Chilean system of node pricing, which performs a similar 
function) imposes smoothing by only allowing distributors to pass through the smoothed 
price. However the smoothing mechanism itself is problematic. It represents a six month 
forward looking average of electricity prices and is reset every six months. As pointed 
out above the existence of a seasonal price puts a ceiling on the amount that distributors 
can pay for purchased power. This has worked to inhibit efficient long term contracting. 
 
An open auction for long-term contracts to supply regulated customers combined with 
some benchmarking of the long-term contract prices paid by the distributors on behalf of 
their regulated customers would ensure a large degree of smoothing. It would also ensure 
that high prices at times of shortage would be reflected (at least in expectation and in the 
price of un-contracted demands) in the regulated price. If there was still a need for 
smoothing the final price there could be a smoothing mechanism introduced on the final 
price to spread the payment for the high cost electricity by regulated customers. This 
could easily be achieved by a limit on the maximum price rise in any six month period 
followed by a period of over recovery in prices to make up any revenue shortfall to cover 
the extra purchased power costs. 
 
A major problem with the seasonal price recently has been the fact that it is formally set 
by the Secretary of Energy. From 1992 until 2002 this price was set at the value 
suggested by the CAMMESA model. However recently the Secretary of Energy set the 
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price at a lower level than the model suggested. Normally this would be problematic 
because it would lead to a shortfall in what generators would get paid by distributors. 
However the Secretary also had control over the fund which balanced the differences 
between the spot prices paid to the generators and the seasonal prices by distributors. He 
was able to use the accumulated surplus in this fund (arising from the period when the 
seasonal price lagged the downward movements in the spot price) to bridge this deficit. If 
there is to be a seasonal price it should always be based on a computer simulation not on 
a political decision.  
 
The final customer market can be further liberalised. Currently customers with peak 
demands above 30 kW can choose supplier freely. Prior to the recent crisis the Argentine 
electricity sector had got all of the preconditions in force for full retail competition, as the 
ultimate target in the development of its electricity market. This would have  important 
positive downstream effects in terms of reducing the degree of regulation in the industry 
and its potentially distortionary effects. Such a move towards full supply competition was 
part of the failed proposals for reform in 1999 (Resolution 545 of 1999). The advantages 
of full supply competition might include better long term contracting for electricity 
supply and the emergence of multi-utility consumer offerings should consumers value 
these. 
 
4.4 The Practice of Regulation 
 
Small users should have been formally represented in the regulatory process. One of 
the rationales for heavy central government involvement in the electricity sector is to 
represent the interests of small customers. However this can be done directly by 
involving small users on the CAMMESA board and via a separately constituted 
consumer body to handle customer complaints (currently these are handled within 
ENRE). Such a body would have created an informed consumer voice, which would have 
reduced the need for the involvement of the Secretary of Energy in the process. It would 
also have educated consumers of the benefits of the reforms and need for a quicker 
resolution of the current payments crisis within the sector. 
 
Accounting separation of distribution and retailing should have  been a priority for 
ENRE. A notable failure in the practice of regulating the electricity sector has been the 
failure to establish the detailed information collection systems on which modern 
regulation of incumbent network utilities depends. As we noted above there should be 
clear separation of the regulated and non-regulated businesses and between the non-
competitive and potentially competitive businesses. If there is to be effective regulation 
of distribution access charges and further retail market opening it is essential to collect 
detailed information on distribution and retailing costs. It was the strict separation of 
these costs in the UK that eventually lead regulated distribution utilities to realise that 
they did not benefit from integration with supply companies. This has lead to the 
separation of many of the regional distribution wires businesses from the local retailing 
of power. ENRE has been existence for over a decade; most regulatory agencies make the 
establishment of appropriate financial reporting by regulated companies a top priority. 
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Regulatory oversight of crisis management at times of supply failure is crucial. The 
success of any reform process is threatened by a badly handled supply failure. As 
Auckland (1998), Buenos Aires (1999), California (2000) and New York (2003) 
demonstrate prolonged supply failures raise questions about the efficacy of reform. While 
supply failure penalties encourage investment to reduce supply failure risk, it is neither 
possible nor sensible to eliminate all risk of supply failure. This implies that there should 
be a crisis management plan should a bad supply failure occurr. As the integrity of the 
system is called into question by such a failure it should be the job of the regulatory 
agency to ensure that all the relevant companies have an up to date crisis management 
plan. It should also be the case that the regulatory agency itself knows how to respond in 
a crisis. During the Edesur incident the company  apparently did not have an adequate 
crisis management plan, particularly for handling the media. It also seems to be the case 
that ENRE did not have a similar crisis management plan and was itself slow to realise 
that its own competence and the competence of the whole privatised industry would be 
called into question by this incident.77 
 
 
ENRE enforced arbitrary quality standards. Distribution companies in Argentina 
complain about the enforcement of arbitrary quality standards by ENRE. ENRE were free 
under the legislation to define quality standards but these were significantly tightened 
during the 1990s to the extent that fine income was increasing in spite of the fact that 
general supply quality was improving. The effect of these apparently arbitrary standards 
was to threaten revenue adequacy and increase uncertainty. The serious ‘Edesur incident’ 
resulted in ENRE imposing a special fine of $100m instead of the $10m, which would 
have been due under the existing quality incentive scheme. Arbitrary fines of this nature 
violate the principle that fines should be levied on observed outcomes not on intermediate 
measures (such as the observation of management failure). The reason for this principle is 
to encourage efficient responses (especially among firms who are not fined) to well 
specified social preferences for quality.  
 
Serious incidents, which call the existing penalty system into question, should be handled 
by ex post inquiry to learn lessons for the future. Edesur paid the fine rather than risk 
losing their concession, however in principle incompetent franchisees should not be given 
the opportunity to buy their way back into the franchise if the costs of leaving them in 
place in the future may outweigh the benefits. If ENRE were serious about learning the 
regulatory incentives from Edesur they would have enquir ed into it thoroughly. However 
there was not a full enquiry into the incident and the only document ENRE ever 
published on the incident was a chapter in their annual report. By contrast the recent New 
York power cut led to many pages of reports on the FERC website. 
 
The regulatory agency, ENRE, has been politically undermined over the years. 
Instead of evolving a strong independent regulatory agency for electricity ENRE appears 
to have grown much weaker over the years.78 This is because of continuing interference 
by the Secretary of Energy. This has manifested itself via: the pressure to impose a large 
                                                
77 See Ullsberg (2002). 
78 See Abdala (2001) for examples of the way that ENRE was undermined. 
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number of penalties; the continuing role for the Secretary of Energy in the setting of the 
access charge the contract price; and the overturning of the 1998 Transener price review 
and the delaying of the 2002 distribution price review. The number and quality of 
professional staff declined over time and for several months during 2003 ENRE only had 
2 commissioners out of 5. As ENRE needs 3 commissioners to pass any resolutions it is 
effectively unable to function in its current state. Once established by statute, regulatory 
agencies should not be subject to operational oversight from a government minister but 
should be subject to judicial review by the Competition Authority or the independent 
government auditor. 
 
4.5 The General Institutional Framework 
 
Individual electricity customers should have to pay market-based prices for 
electricity. Between 1992 and 2001 Argentina successfully moved from a pricing system 
for electricity in which many poor customers were allowed to avoid paying for electricity 
to one where those who could pay, paid something, and those who could not received a 
direct subsidy to pay their electricity bill. Many developing countries face this non-
payment problem and have struggled to deal with it. Argentina dealt with it in a way that 
is consistent with the economic principle that re-distributions of wealth should be 
achieved via taxes and subsidies not via cross subsidy. This principle encourages more 
efficient and safe use of energy and encourages companies to connect poor customers to 
their networks (as was the case with shanty town connections). Since the crisis, 
artificially low electricity and gas prices have served to create a disequilibrium between 
the demand and supply of electricity. The experience of 2002-2004 and the inevitable 
power cuts and increased government intervention amply illustrate that the laws of supply 
and demand should be allowed to apply to the electricity market.79 
 
In the electricity sector, as in the economy in general, one politically inspired 
distortion of prices and regulation tends to make additional political interference 
more likely. We have noted a number of examples of political interference in the 
Argentine electricity sector which have only led to further problems. These include: the 
keeping of the access charge in distribution too low leading to pressure on residential 
rates; the restriction of the rise in final prices leading to payment problems in the 
generation market; and the failure to appoint directors to ENRE leading to the inability of 
the regulatory agency to function properly leading to more political input into the 
regulation. Successful regulatory regimes involve self-restraint by politicians and 
political institutions in what is often the complex business of setting the right incentives 
in the electricity sector. Arbitrary intervention by politicians in the operation of a 
decentralised electricity market is likely to have unintended consequences, because 
ministers are less well informed than well resourced regulatory agencies. The setting up 
of a state owned energy company to respond to some of the ‘market failures’ associated 
with politically inspired price setting in the energy sector illustrates the vicious circle of 
ever increasing intervention to which badly thought out policies lead . 
 
                                                
79 ‘The laws of economics bite back’, The Economist, 24th April 2004, p.35 
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Government ministers should not be involved in approving or implementing 
regulatory decisions, which should properly be delegated to a regulatory agency. In 
general government ministers, such as the Secretary of Energy, should not undertake 
tasks that should properly be the task of regulatory agencies, such as setting regulated 
prices. They should not be able to control funds collected from electricity consumers fo r 
specific purposes, such as smoothing price differentials or paying for transmission 
capacity. Instead these funds should be in ring fenced funds. In the case of Argentina 
there should have been no role for the Secretary of Energy in the governance of 
CAMMESA, in the setting of the seasonal price, in the arbitration of disputes or in the 
approving of regulated tariff changes or in the control of electricity specific funds. In 
Argentina the Secretary of Energy continued to control the operation of the electricity 
market and its regulation despite the setting up of an ISO and an independent electricity 
regulator via his control of the governance structure of CAMMESA and his authority 
over ENRE.80 The government should restrict itself to the setting of future policy 
developments and avoid having anything to do with the day to day running of the current 
system. Oversight of this should rest initially with another regulatory authority, namely 
the Competition Agency. 
 
ENRE should have become a truly national regulatory agency with authority over 
all electricity utilities in the country. For a small country like Argentina the 
establishment of separate regulatory agencies for each province does not make sense. 
Even in the UK where there is now a Scottish Parliament the interconnected electricity 
system in England and Wales and Scotland is regulated by the national electricity 
regulator, OFGEM. Germany has recently been forced by the European Union to 
introduce a national energy regulatory agency, having previously left regulation of 
distribution utilities to its provinces. The seasonal pricing mechanism in Argentina was 
motivated by the inability to get the provinces to standardise their distribution tariffs. 
Distribution access pricing rules and regulated customer seasonal price pass through 
arrangements can differ by province. Many regulatory agencies in the provinces are small 
(they range for 7 to 40 staff and often cover several industries)81. ENRE has played a key 
role in providing support to provincial regulatory agencies. These agencies have limited 
capacity to regulate distribution and retail tariffs. ENRE itself would benefit from 
extension of its role as it could undertake benchmarking exercises between the large 
number of distribution utilities that there are in Argentina as opposed to the three that it 
regulates. A compromise measure might be to merge all of the provincial regulators into 
one body82, though this poses political problems given the unwillingness of the provinces 
to cede power to the central government. 
 
The current position of ENRE was not inevitable. The government has let ENRE’s 
credibility and expertise wither away because of neglect. While this is understandable 
given the magnitude of the macroeconomic crisis, it was not the only strategy available to 
them. It reflects an unwillingness to deal with the payments crisis facing the sector. 
Maintaining a strong ENRE would have allowed the government to use the regulatory 
                                                
80 See Rodriguez-Pardina (2004) for more details. 
81 See Estache (1997). 
82 See Artana et al. (2001). 
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agency to take a lead role in assessing financial requirements of the industry as part of 
pricing negotiation with the companies. The current strategy stores up trouble for the 
future as it demonstrates a predisposition on the part of state to circumvent an 
independent regulatory authority when convenient, rather than work with it. It is not an 
optimal policy response to a macroeconomic crisis to throw out what should be one of 
your most effective microeconomic institutions. It is interesting to observe that the 
inevitable political response to a crisis in the electricity sector is not to always get rid of 
the electricity regulatory agency or weaken its powers. The two agencies responsible for 
the regulation of the Californian electricity market (the FERC and the local California 
Public Utilities Commission) were heavily criticised but they did not have their powers 
weakened. 
 
In an economy with significant overlapping electricity and gas interests the gas and 
electricity regulators should be merged. Currently there are separate electricity and gas 
regulators in Argentina. This has created inconsistencies in the way that the gas and 
electricity markets have been handled in recent years.83 There is no spot market in gas 
and the gas price has been fixed in Pesos. This has lead to scheduling distortions between 
stations using Argentine and Bo livian gas. There is a need to co-ordinate the expansion of 
the gas and electricity networks to ensure least cost optimisation of the two networks. It is 
currently (mid 2004) the case that it is easier to expand the gas network. There is a strong 
possibility of inefficient arbitraging between the gas and electricity markets to make 
optimal use of energy. To achieve this there is also a need to co-ordinate the regulated 
rate of return and the congestion charging regimes in the two networks in order to prevent 
inefficient arbitrage. Regulatory consistency is required. Incidentally, it may also be 
easier to keep the Secretary of Energy from interfering in the sector if there is a more 
powerful regulatory agency with responsibility for consistent regulation between the two 
sectors. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
Argentina’s electricity reform contains two sets of lessons for developing countries. First, 
comprehensive electricity reform can work in a developing country. Second, well 
organised markets and effective network regulation are undermined by political 
interference in the pricing of electricity. 
 
Argentina’s electricity reform is a fascinating test case. It represents the application of a 
combination of the successful Chilean and UK electricity models in a developing country 
context. Between 1992 and 2001 the reformed sector functioned very well. The 
generation market was very successful and was the least concentrated generation market 
then operating anywhere in the world. It managed to deliver falling prices, improving 
productivity and new investment. In transmission and distribution private ownership was 
successful at improving technical and cost efficiency and increasing investment. 
However some serious regulatory issues emerged. In particular the process for approval 
of large transmission upgrades was controversial and the regulator was subject to political 
influence, which unnecessarily increased the uncertainty of the regulated revenue of 
                                                
83 See Abdala (2001) for an articulation of this view. 
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network companies. Private ownership and the private institutions of the market 
(CAMMESA and the various industry associations) performed well. However the 
problems that existed in the sector prior to 2002 had been widely recognised and some 
were in the process of being solved. 
 
At the heart of any well functioning private industry is the operation of the fundamental 
laws of supply and demand. This implies that prices must be allowed to rise to bring the 
supply and demand for electricity into balance. Private companies must be given the 
prospect of earning fair returns to new investments. If this is not allowed to happen either 
electricity shortages in Argentina will get worse and/or economic growth will be further 
reduced and/or other forms of government intervention (such as state ownership and 
subsidies) will increase. Electricity sector reform requires a minimum commitment on the 
part of the government to market based pricing of energy and to a stable regulatory 
environment. Clearly the macroeconomic crisis of 2002 profoundly affected the 
Argentine economy as a whole and the electricity sector in particular. The private sector 
has been remarkably disciplined in keeping the lights on while negotiations about current 
pricing and compensation for past losses continue. However the normal operation of the 
laws of supply and demand need to be re-established if the substantial advantages that 
private ownership and organisation of the electricity system have delivered in Argentina 
are not to be undone. 
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Information Appendices 
 
Figure 1: Basic capacity in the MEM and MEMSP systems 
 
 
Source: CAMMESA 2002 Annual Report, p.24. 
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Figure 2: MEM and MEMSP Transmission System Map 
 
Source: ENRE. 
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Figure 3: Evolution of Total Capacity in MW in the MEM 
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Figure 4: Generation market shares by company in 2002 
 
Source: ENRE. 
Note: Estatal = state owned companies (nuclear and hydro). 
 
 
PECOM
7,1%
PLUSPETROL
6,5%
CAPEX
5,3%
AUTO/COGENERADORES
3,5%
ESTATAL
31,2%
OTROS
3,8%
CMS
2,1%EDF
2,5%DUKE
2,8%
TOTALFINA
12,3%
ENDESA
11,6%
AES
8,6%
PROVINCIALES
2,9%
39 
Table 1: Distribution Company Characteristics (end of 2001) 
 
    
      
         
Empresa Area Nº Clientes Energ. Vend FactxVent/sI Pot. Max. Perdidas 
 Km2  Gwh Miles de $ Mw % 
EDENOR 4637 2249638 13034 853746 2793.5 12.32 
EDESUR 3309 2089997 12166 821465 2547 11.55 
APELP 75050 31 442.3 27292 90.47 4.56 
EDESE 150536 153083 443.8 50860.3 113 16.7 
SECHEEP 99663 200652 776 98967.1 211.5 21.91 
EDESAL  76750 112311 548.5 53900 143.7 10.9 
EDELAR  89680 78190 423 38413 112.8 9.5 
EDESA 155488 214732 787.2 79180 170.5 10.8 
ESJ S.A 85226 153381 592 53920 183 14.72 
EDEA SA 105438 406865 1701 151713 388 12.86 
EPEN 93603 47024 566.6 42253.5 100.2 9.12 
EDEERSA 56287 235261 1122 102187 322 9.8 
EdERSA 203000 142896 708.5 57762 175 11.22 
EJESA 22060 122010 380.7 43575 88.77 9.7 
EDEMSA 109908 320100 2127 146648 399 13.55 
EDECAT 106,000 86540 268.1 28832 83 29.2 
EDET SA 22524 318369 1164 108116 278 12.8 
EMSA 16206 118851 833.3 69407.9 208.7 23.3 
EPEC 165321 637413 3849.1 335724 1025 e/elabor  
DPEC 88000 192981 647.8 90517 228.8 41.38 
EDELAP 5780 275937 1113 92320.2 299.9 12.37 
EDES 76259 140628 577.1 54046.8 123.8 15.6 
EDEN 110543 272010 1707.4 133857 316.1 12.52 
EPESF 114690 876934 3838 350392 899 25.8 
EDEFOR 72000 90061 315.1 32216 103 31.2 
EDESTESA 36668 34218 393.5 22471 81 7.32 
Co.Salto  120 10011 58.1 5221.8 12.7 6.29 
(Co. Colon) 883 8698 32 3196 5.95 8.04 
Co.Pergam 595.8 31362 141.2 14867 34 13.9 
(Co. Zarate) 1202 26651 219 17389 51.3 14.9 
(CO. Lujan) 77.7 32574 207.8 19013 41.59 11.56 
Co.M.Moren 2158 14966 45 5561.9 10.4 15.56 
Co.Azul 6545 23639 85.2 8715.4 18.6 6 
Co.San Pedro  1322 19357 83.86 8112.62 18.6 7.6 
Co.Chacabuc. 2288 17525 59.5 10312.8 13.8 12.55 
Co.Olavarria 7659 39643 132.4 13909 34.3 10.31 
Co.Tandil 300.46 40115 166.99 14904.8 35 9.66 
TOTAL  2167776.96 9834654 43431.35 3814857.42 11169.18 
Est. al 17/06/03 Los datos en rojo corresponden al año 2001     
 
Source: www.adeera.com.ar
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Figure 5: Real average tariffs (2001 pesos) 
 
 Source:Devoto and Cardozo (2002, p.16). 
 
41 
Figure 6: Breakdown of average tariff into generation (purple bar), transmission (red 
bar) and distribution (yellow bar) components (2001 pesos). 
 
Source: Devoto and Cardozo (2002, p.20). 
Note: VAD = value added in distribution. 
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Figure 7: Evolution of prices in bulk power prices in the MEM: energy price (blue bar) 
and energy plus capacity price (red bar). 
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Source: CAMMESA website, ENRE and INDEC Argentina. 
Note: 1 Argentine Peso = 1 US Dollar from 1992 to 2001; 2002: 1 US$=3.07 Peso; 2003: 
1 US$=2.95 Peso. 
 
7.2 MEM Prices in 1999 Pesos
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Source: CAMMESA website, ENRE and INDEC Argentina. 
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Figure 8: Evolution of Tariffs for different types of customers (2001 pesos) 
 
Source: Devoto and Cardozo (2002, p.22). 
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Figure 9: Thermal Plant Unavailability (% of capacity unavailable) 
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Figure 10: Labour Productivity in Endesa Argentina Generation 
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Source: Endesa Annual Report 1999 and 2003 (available at www.endesa.cl). 
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Figure 11: Labour Productivity in Distribution Companies in Greater Buenos Aires 
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Source: Edenor and Edesur Annual Reports
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 Figure 12: Technical and Non-technical losses (%) in Greater Buenos Aires 
Electric Losses (percentage)
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Source: Edenor and Edesur Annual Reports 
 
